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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JAMES HORNSBY,
Appellant-Plaintiff,
vs.
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS,
a Utah corporation sole,
CHARLES GIBLETT, JOHN SUTTON,
and JOHN DOES, I through X,
inclusive,

Appeal from Third
District Court,
Honorable Timothy Hanson
District Court Judge
No. C-83-5019

Utah Supreme Court
No. 860007

Respondents-Defendants
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendants Sutton incorporate by reference the
"Statement of the Case" as set forth in defendants LDS Church and
Giblett's brief, with the following additional facts:
1.

From 7975 West (accident site), which is the

driveway to the Haslam property where the cow crossed the road
and Hornsby laid down his bike, to the corner of 8200 West and
2820 South where plaintiff Hornsby made a right hand turn (R.
812), the distance, as measured by John Sutton, is 375 feet (R.
576, 578 and Exhibit 9).
2.

From 7975 West (accident site) to where Mary

Sutton parked her vehicle, with its emergency light flashing (R.

799, 782), just off the traveled portion of the eastbound lane of
2820 South and where Mary Sutton was standing by her driverfs
side door on the hardtop of the eastbound lane waving her arms
attempting to warn Hornsby as he passed by her and her vehicle,
the distance, as measured by John Sutton, is 210 feet (R. 578,
579 and Exhibit G; 9) .
3.

From Mary Suttonfs parked vehicle on 2820 South to

8200 West the distance is 165 feet (R. 792 and Exhibit 7, 9). As
Hornsby drove the 165 feet on 2820 South in the eastbound lane
from the intersection of 8200 West a) he passed Mary Sutton
standing on the hardtop in the eastbound lane waving her arms in
an attempt to warn Hornsby of potential danger ahead, and (b) he
passed her parked vehicle with its emergency lights flashing.

At

the time he passed her, she said he was accelerating and
exceeding the speed limit, which was 35 mph, (R. 799, 802, 806
and 891). Hornsby said he was going 30raph.when he laid his
motorcycle down at the time of the accident (R. 926)
4.

As Hornsby drove the additional 210 feet on 2820

South to the accident site at 7975 West he passed John Sutton who
was standing on the hardtop in the eastbound lane with his back
to eastbound traffic watching for the cow to come from the back
of the Haslam property so that if it came out of the driveway at
7975 West, he could attempt to direct the cow back to his fenced
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property across 2820 South (R. 576 and Exhibit 5). His mere
presence in the eastbound lane of 2820 South constituted a
warning of potential danger ahead to an approaching motorist such
as Hornsby.
5.

Hornsby testified that Mary Sutton's vehicle was

10-15 feet from the corner of 8200 West and 2820 South, which is
where he drew it in his deposition (Exhibit 38), that he turned
his head to look at Mary Sutton and when he turned back, the cow
was there in the middle of the road, 10-15 feet in front of Mary
Sutton's vehicle (R. 93^-935).

Hornsby believed he saw the cow

two seconds after he passed Mary Sutton's vehicle and that the
first time he saw the cow it was in the middle of the road (R.
935).

At that time, he testified in his deposition he was going

15-20 mph. (but changed his testimony at trial to 30 mph.) (R.
926) and that he could stop his vehicle in 10 feet when traveling
15-20 mph. (R. 936). He testified he took his eyes off of the
road to look at the girl (Mary Sutton) and when he looked back,
the cow was in front of him (R. 937).
6.

Immediately after Hornsby had laid his motorcycle

down and was sitting in the street, he was questioned as to
whether or not he had seen Mary Sutton attempting to warn him and
in response, according to Mary Sutton he stated:

"If I had

realized what that girl was trying to tell me this probably
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wouldnft have happened." and according to John Sutton, he stated:
f,

I wished Ifd slowed up when that girl was waving at me or

something, and I wouldn't be here now." (R. 586). Hornsby did
not deny having made such a statement.
7.

Don Stewart, an expert in handling and loading

livestock, testified that the manner in which the two cows were
loaded, given the facilities available as viewed in Exhibits 1,
2, 3 and 4, was in accordance with the customary and usual way of
loading cattle in this community and was a reasonable and safe
way to load (R. 875-876).

He testified that hundreds of cattle a

day are loaded the same way at the stockyards and that he has
done it the same way at John Sutton's premises without ever
having a problem (R. 876).
8.

Steve Williams, an expert in handling and loading

livestock, testified that the manner in which the two 700 pound
cows were loaded, given the facilities as viewed in Exhibits 1,
2, 3 and 4, complied with the normal and usual practice in the
Salt Lake County area (R. 905, 912).
9.

Garth Boswell, an expert who has either supervised

or participated in the loading and unloading of 5,000 to 10,000
head of cattle per year over the last 10 years (R. 501),
testified that, assuming that two cows each weighing 700 pounds
each loaded as was attempted in this case, as indicated in
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Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4 and using bailing wire to secure the
corral gate in the trailer with the hook secured in the loop, it
was his opinion such practice of securing the trailer to the
corral was a customary way of loading cattle in this community
and that he had done it himself that way about 5,000 times (R.
502-504).
10.

John Sutton testified that he had had four or five

years experience in loading cows at his facility with trailers
prior to the accident, that over that time he had loaded "a
hundred or so" cows in the same way he was attempting to load on
the day of the accident and that he had never had a cow escape
utilizing such a loading process other than this one (R. 572).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendants Sutton incorporate by reference the "Summary
of Argument" as set forth in defendants LDS Church and Giblett's
brief, with the following additional arguments.
1.

Whether or not the court properly conducted its

voir dire examination regarding potential partiality due to the
involvement of the LDS Church has no bearing upon the verdict of
the jury in favor of defendants Sutton who were found not to be
negligent in any manner and against plaintiff Hornsby, who was
found 100% at fault.

Prejudice or lack thereof regarding the LDS

Church should have no bearing upon the verdict of the jury in
favor of defendants Sutton.
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2.

Whether or not it was improper for defense counsel

for the LDS Church and Giblett to refer to his client LDS Church
as the "Welfare Farm," should have no bearing upon the jury
verdict in favor of defendants Sutton.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS NO REVERSIBLE ERROR BY THE TRIAL
COURT JUDGE IN THE COURT'S VOIR DIRE
EXAMINATION OF PROSPECTIVE JURORS REGARDING
POTENTIAL PARTIALITY DUE TO INVOLVEMENT WITH
THE DEFENDANT CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS (THIS POINT DOES NOT APPLY
TO DEFENDANTS SUTTON)
This point applies only to defendants LDS Church and
Giblett and does not apply to defendants Sutton.

Whether or not

the jury may have been prejudiced in favor of defendants LDS
Church and Giblett by the error alleged by plaintiff should have
no effect upon the decision of the jury finding that defendant
Suttons were not negligent.
POINT II
THERE WAS NO REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ALLOWING
DEFENSE COUNSEL FOR THE LDS CHURCH AND
GIBLETT TO REFER TO HIS CLIENT AS "THE
WELFARE FARM" (THIS POINT DOES NOT APPLY TO
DEFENDANTS SUTTON)
This point applies only to defendants LDS Church and
Giblett and does not apply to defendants Sutton.

Whether or not

the jury may have been prejudiced in favor of defendants LDS
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Church and Giblett by the error alleged by plaintiff should have
no effect upon the decision of the jury finding that defendant
Suttons were not negligent.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE AN
INSTRUCTION ON RES IPSA LOQUITUR
Defendants Sutton incorporate by reference the
arguments made under Point III of defendants LDS Church and
Giblett's brief with the following additional argument.
A.

The district court did not commit prejudicial

error of law by refusing to instruct the jury on res ipsa
loquitur because plaintiff failed to meet his burden of
establishing all three evidentiary prerequisites necessary to
invoke the doctrine.
In Ballow v. Monroe, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985),
the Utah Supreme Court reiterated the three evidentiary
prerequisites to application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur:
The plaintiff must prove that: (1) the
event causing the damage is of a type that
ordinarily would not happen except for
someone's negligence; (2) the damage must
have been caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive control
of the defendant; and, (3) the plaintiff's
own use of the agency or instrumentality was
not primarily responsible for the injury.
[Citations omitted.3
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Ballow, 699 P.2d at 721.
With respect to the first prerequisite, the court in
Ballow specifically held that plaintiff, before he may
rely upon res ipsa loquitur, must introduce evidence that the
occurrence of the incident was more probably than not caused by
negligence:
Before a plaintiff is entitled to a jury
instruction on res ipsa loquitur, the
plaintiff must have presented evidence that
the occurrence of the incident is "more
probably than not caused by negligence."
[Citation omitted.] The plaintiff need not
eliminate all possible inferences of
non-negligence, but the balance of
probabilities must weigh in favor of
negligence, or res ipsa loquitur does not

a££l£.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has
no application unless it can be shown
from past experience that the
occurrence causing the disability is
more likely the result of negligence
than some other cause. . . . In . . .
Tomei v. Henning, 67 Cal.2d 319
[62 Cal.Rptr. 9, 431 P.2d 633 (1967)],
the Supreme Court of [California] had
this to say:
Since the res ipsa loquitur
instruction permits the jury to
infer negligence from the
happening of the accident alone,
there must be a basis either in
common knowledge or expert
testimony that when such an
accident occurs, it is more
probably than not the result of
negligence.
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Ballow, 699 P.2d at 722 (emphasis added).

In short,

lf

[w]hen . . . the probabilities of a situation are outside the

realm of common knowledge, expert evidence may be used to
establish the necessary foundational probabilities."

Id.

(emphasis added) .
In Ballow, plaintiff brought an action against
defendant to recover damages for the loss of approximately 100
acres of wheat and several rods of fencing owned by plaintiff
which were destroyed by a fire apparently caused by defendant
when swathing his adjoining field.

The evidence at trial

tended to establish that the risk of fire was inherent in
normal swathing under the conditions which existed at the time
of the accident.

Consequently, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed

the trial court's refusal to give a res ipsa loquitur
instruction:
The plaintiff in this case failed to
establish a foundation warranting res ipsa
loquitur instructions. The evidence casts
no light on whether the fire which burned
plaintiff's property was probably caused by
defendant's negligence. Plaintiff's
testimony was that fires are virtually
unavoidable when swathing and that fires
"just happen," even when exercising
reasonable care. On this testimony, the
jury could, of course, have found that
defendant had a duty to take reasonable
precautions to prevent the spread of fire,
but that raises no issue concerning res
ipsa loquitur.
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Id., at 723 (emphasis added).
In Reed v. Molnar, 67 Ohio St.2d 76, 423 N.E.2d
140 (1981), the Ohio Supreme Court stated as follows:
A division of authority exists on the
question of the applicability of res ipsa
loquitur to animal escape cases. Without
passing on the first branch of the foregoing
test, we find that it may not be said that
the presence of unattended cattle on the
public highway is an occurrence that would
not have materialized absent someone's
negligence. Thus, the doctrine is
inapplicable and appellants were not
prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to
instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur.
In coming to this conclusion we are not
unmindful of the legislative recognition
implicit in R.C. 951.09 that animals
may escape without fault or negligence of
their owners. Similarly, there has been
judicial recognition that cattle and other
domestic animals can escape from perfectly
adequate confines. [Citations omitted.]
Reed, 423 N.E.2d at 145 (footnote omitted; emphasis
added) .
In Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel Corporation, 681 P.2d
1232 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court required the same
three prerequisites for the application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur but expressed them a little differently as
follows:
(1) That the accident was of a kind which,
in the ordinary course of events, would not
have happened had due care been observed;
(2) that the plaintiff's own use or
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operation of the agency or instrumentality
was not primarily responsible for the
injury; and (3) that the agency or
instrumentality causing the injury was under
the exclusive management or control of the
defendant.
Based on the foregoing authority, plaintiff failed to
meet the first prerequisite of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur because the
accident (motorcyclist laying dowri
motorcycle to avoid collision with cow
darting into roadway) was of the kind which,
in the ordinary course of events, (would or
could happen if due care is not observed.)
There were three separate circumstances at three
separate intervals which existed in the road ahead which would
have alerted a motorcyclist exercising due care of a potential
hazard or danger ahead, which Hornsby ignored or failed to
observe and respond to in this case:
1.

At 375 feet from accident site.

Hornsby could

have observed a stopped vehicle with its emergency lights
flashing just off the traveled portion of the eastbound lane
about 165 feet ahead of him.

If he had observed the same, he

should have proceeded with caution.
2.

At 210 feet from accident site.

Hornsby could

have observed a woman standing in his lane next to the stopped
vehicle waving her arms in an attempt to warn him of a
potential hazard or danger ahead.
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3.

At 210 feet from accident site.

Hornsby could

have observed a man standing in his lane with his back to him.
The mere presence of a man in such a position would have
alerted a reasonably prudent motorcyclist to proceed with
caution.
If, as Hornsby testified, he was going 30 mph., which
is 45 feet per second, it would have taken him almost 5 seconds
to reach the accident site, clearly enough time to slow his
vehicle, find out why two people were standing in his lane of
travel and proceed slowly with caution.

By his own testimony,

he took his eyes off the road when he passed Mary Sutton and
when he looked back, the cow was in the middle of the road.
The cow did not appear out of nowhere.

It had to come from the

side of the road (Point A) in order to get to the middle of the
road (Point B) . It would have taken some time to get from
Point A to Point B.

Hornsby, after disregarding the warning

given by Mary Sutton, traveled a considerable distance without
looking ahead.

Obviously, if Hornsby was looking ahead and

driving at a reasonable speed, he easily could have seen John
Sutton standing in the road ahead with his back to him, he
could have seen

the cow approaching the road, slowed down,

allowed the cow to proceed and avoid having to lay his
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motorcycle down on the road.

If Hornsby had exercised due

care, there would have been no accident.
Thus, the "event causing the damage" was the
negligence of Hornsby, to whom the jury assessed 100$ of the
fault.

Since the "event causing the damage" was the negligence

of Hornsby and because the accident was of the kind which
happens when due care is not observed," the first prerequisite
to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not satisfied.
With respect to the second prerequisite necessary to
invoke res ipsa loquitur, the Utah Supreme Court held in
Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp., supra, that
defendant's exclusive control of the agency or instrumentality
which caused plaintiff's injury must continue to and include
the time of the accident.

In Denver & R.G.R. Co. v.

Ashton-Whyte-Skillicorn Co., 49 Utah 82, 162 P. 83 (1916),
plaintiff brought an action against defendant to recover for
damage to and destruction of certain personal property,
including two railroad cars, allegedly caused by defendant's
negligence.

The evidence at trial demonstrated plaintiff had

loaned two railroad cars to defendant for use in its business.
Somehow the cars escaped from defendant's premises and rolled
down plaintiff's railroad track, eventually colliding with and
causing damage to other railroad cars.
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Plaintiff relied on the

doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
plaintiff, and it appealed.

The trial court nonsuited

On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court

affirmed the nonsuit and held that plaintiff could not rely on
res ipsa loquitur because it had failed to prove the cars "were
under the immediate control and management of the defendant" at
the time they escaped and eventually collided with plaintifffs
other cars.

Denver & R.G.R. Co., 162 P. at 85.

In Zampos v. United States Smelting, Refining
and Mining Co., 206 F.2d 171, 177 (10th Cir. 1953) (applying
Utah law), the Court held that if the circumstances surrounding
the accident in which plaintiff was injured, "are equally
consistent with a cause which would not be attributable to
negligence, the doctrine [of res ipsa loquitur] does not apply.
[Citation omitted.]"

In Trigg v. City and County of

Denver, Docket No. 83-2397 (filed March 4, 1986, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit) (applying Colorado law), the
Court reiterated that a plaintiff invoking res ipsa loquitur
"must demonstrate the absence of equally probable alternative
causes for [his] injury."

Trigg, slip opinion p.6. In

short, "[i]f there is any other cause apparent to which the
injury may with equal fairness be attributed, the reason for a
res ipsa loquitur inference fails, and the rule should not be
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invoked."

.Id., citing, Restatement (Second) of Torts §

328D, comment f (1965).
The decisions of the Utah Supreme Court are in accord
with the foregoing.

Wightman v. Mountain Fuel Supply

Co., 5 Utah 2d 373, 302 P.2d 471, 474 (1956) (trial court
correctly refused to instruct on res ipsa loquitur where "there
was no reasonable basis shown in the evidence which would
justify a conclusion that there was any greater likelihood"
that accident was causally connected to instrumentality over
which defendant had control); Jenson v. S. H. Kress &
Co., 87 Utah 434, 49 P.2d 958, 960-961 (1935) (no basis in
common knowledge or record to infer that broken glass shelf in
defendant's merchantile establishment, which caused plaintiff's
injuries, occurred more probably than not as a result of
defendant's negligence.)
Based upon the foregoing authority, there are two
reasons why plaintiff failed to meet the second prerequisite.
First, there is absolutely no proof in the record that
defendants' control over the cow continued to the time of the
accident.
Second, plaintiff demonstrably failed to prove the
absence of equally probable alternative causes for the accident
such as plaintiff Hornsby's own negligence described herein. A
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res ipsa loquitur instruction is improper unless plaintiff
successfully demonstrates that the cause he proposes is more
probably than not the effective causative agent.

In this case,

he completely failed to meet that burden.
In Poole v. Gillison, 15 F.R.D. 194 (E.D.Ark.
1953) the court held as follows:
Now, a mule is not an inanimate object
without any independent volition, but is a
live animal possessed of a brain and an
intelligence of its own; the mules in this
case broke out of their enclosure in the
night time of their own volition while
[defendant] was in bed. Under such
circumstances we do not think it can be said
that they were under his exclusive control
and management at the time that they broke
out of the lot to the extent necessary to
invoke the res ipsa doctrine. Moreover,
even if it be assumed that they were under
his exclusive control and management while
they were in the lot, it does not follow
that they were so subject at the time of the
collision, and, under Arkansas law, it is
ordinarily required to invoke said doctrine
that the exclusive control of the defendant
shall have continued up to the time of the
plaintiff's injury. [Citation omitted. ]
Poole, 15 F.R.D. at 199 (emphasis added).
Because (1) there is no basis in common knowledge
that the presence of a cow on a public highway is more probably
than not the result of negligence, and (2) it is difficult, if
not impossible, to prove defendant maintained exclusive control
over the animal up to and including the time of the accident,

16

the majority of courts have refused, either on statutory or
common law grounds, to instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur
in a case similar to this one.

Annotation, Liability of

Owner of Animal for Damage to Motor Vehicle or Injury to Person
Riding Therein Resulting from Collision with Domestic Animal at
Large in Street or Highway, 29 A.L.R.4th 431, 468-470 (1984)
(citing 13 jurisdictions holding res ipsa loquitur inapplicable
compared with 6 jurisdictions holding it applicable).
The plaintiff's proffered instruction no. 24 on res
ipsa loquitur, attached as addendum I to plaintiffs brief,
specified "the bailing wire that came undone" as the
instrumentality over which the defendants exercised "exclusive
management and control" and not the cow.

The instruction did

not fairly and accurately state the law of the state of Utah.
As clearly demonstrated above, however, the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, even when appropriate under all the
circumstances, does not create an inference of a causal
connection between the inferred negligence and plaintiff's
injury, nor does it absolve plaintiff of the burden of proving
specific causation.

Thus, plaintiff's instructions on res ipsa

loquitur was inaccurate.

It is axiomatic that the failure to

give inaccurate res ipsa loquitur instructions is harmless
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error.

Ballow, 699 P.2d at 723; Brownlow v. Aman,

740 F.2d 1476, 1490 (10th Cir. 1984).
B.

The trial court did not commit prejudicial error

of law by refusing to instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur
because Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-38 (1953) as amended, as
construed by the Utah Supreme Court, proscribes any inference
of negligence based upon the mere presence of livestock on a
public highway.
By implication, if not expressly, § 41-6-38
proscribes any inference of negligence arising from the mere
presence of a cow on a public road.

In other words, the burden

remains on every "occupant of a motor vehicle" allegedly
injured as a result of a collision with livestock, to plead and
prove specific acts of negligence on the part of the owner.
That was precisely the holding of this Court when it construed
the statute in Hyrum Smith Estate Co. v. Peterson, 227
F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1955) (applying Utah law). In Hyrum
Smith, plaintiff brought an action against defendant to recover
damages for personal injuries sustained when the motorcycle he
was operating collided with a horse owned by defendant on a
public highway.

At trial, plaintiff relied both upon res ipsa

loquitur and also on defendant's active negligence.
district court, interpreting § 41-6-38, refused to
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The

instruct the jury on res

ipsa loquitur.

Notwithstanding, the

jury returned its verdict in plaintiff's favor, and defendant
appealed.

On appeal, no error was assigned with respect to the

district court's failure to give a res ipsa loquitur
instruction, and this Court wisely declined to consider the
issue further.
Nevertheless, in its opinion in Hyrum Smith, the
Court was required to interpret § 41-6-38 in order to
adequately respond to defendant's claims of court error. After
citing the statute, the Court made the following observations:
So far as we are advised, this section has
never been construed by the Supreme Court of
Utah. We, however, feel that the language
of the statute providing that where a
collision occurs between a motor vehicle and
livestock drifting upon the highway "there
is no presumption that such collision was
due to negligence on behalf of the owner or
the person in possession of such livestock"
is clear and unambiguous and should be given
the meaning naturally flowing therefrom. To
us the language means, and in considering
this question it will be held, that under
Utah law there is no presumption that
appellant was guilty in permitting the
horses to be upon the highway under the
conditions they were found there, and that
the burden rested upon the plaintiff to
establish acts of negligence to entitle him
to have his case submitted to the jury.
Hyrum Smith, 227 F.2d at 444 (emphasis added).

In short,

the Court's specific focus on the statutory requirement of
proof of "acts of negligence," forecloses plaintiff's
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contention that § 41-6-38 permits him to rely on res ipsa
loquitur.
Section 41-6-38 was interpreted by the Utah
Supreme Court for the first time in Rhiness v. Dansie, 24
Utah 2d 375, 472 P.2d 428 (1970).

In that case, plaintiffs'

motor vehicle struck one of defendant's horses on U.S. Highway
6-50 in Spanish Fork Canyon, Utah.

Plaintiffs sued defendant,

but did not rely on res ipsa loquitur either in the trial court
or on appeal.

Plaintiffs successfully established that on the

night of the accident, immediately prior to the collision, one
of defendant's gates was left partially open.

Defendant had

been on his property during that day but testified he left the
gate securely fastened.

Rhiness, 472 P.2d at 429. Based

upon the foregoing evidence, the trial court granted
defendant's motion for directed verdict at the close of
plaintiffs' evidence.

Plaintiffs appealed.

The Utah Supreme Court affirmed.

To properly dispose

of plaintiffs' contentions on appeal, the court was required to
interpret § 41-6-38.

The court specifically held that

section proscribed any inference of negligence from the mere
fact defendant's horse escaped from his pasture and wandered
onto the highway:
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In order for the plaintiffs to recover in
this action, they must show two things:
First, that the highway was fenced on both
sides; and second, that the horses got upon
the highway through the negligence of the
defendant. The mere fact that the animals
escaped from the enclosure is not sufficient
evidence, standing alone, to justify the
submission of defendant's negligence to the
Rhiness, 472 P. 2d at 429-430 (emphasis addecj).
Based upon the foregoing, Judge Hanson correctly
ruled that, under Utah law, plaintiff in this case was not
entitled to a jury instruction on res ipsa loquitur.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
GIVE AN INSTRUCTION ON NEGLIGENCE PER SE
Defendants Sutton incorporate by reference the
arguments made under Point IV of defendants LDS Church and
Giblett's brief with the following additional argument.
Section 41-6-16 Utah Code Annotated (1953) as
amended) provides as follows:
The provisions of this act shall be
applicable and uniform throughout this
state and in all political subdivisions and
municipalities therein and no local
authority shall enact or enforce any rule
or regulation in conflict with the
provisions of this act unless expressly
authorized herein. Local authorities may,
however, adopt regulations consistent with
this act, and additional traffic
regulations which are not in conflict
therewith.
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(Emphasis added.)
Section 41-6-38 Utah Code Annotated, (1953) as
amended which is entitled "Livestock on highway - Collision,
action for damages," which is a part of the "act" referred to
in 41-6-16, provides in pertinent part as follows:
No person owning or controlling the
possession of any livestock, shall
willfully or negligently permit any such
livestock to stray upon or remain
unaccompanied by a person in charge or
control thereof upon a public highway, both
sides of which are adjoined by property
which is separated from such highway by a
fence . . . . No person shall drive any
such livestock upon, over or across any
public highway during the period from half
an hour after sunset to half an hour before
sunrise, without keeping a sufficient
number of herders with warning lights on
continual duty to open the road so as to
permit the passage of vehicles. In any
civil action brought by the owner, driver
or occupant of a motor vehicle or by their
personal representatives or assignees, or
by the owner of the livestock for damages
caused by collision with any domestic
animal or animals on a highway, there is no
presumption that such collision was due to
negligence on behalf of the owner or the
person in possession of such livestock.
(Emphasis added.)
Section 10-10-3 Salt Lake ICounty Ordinance
entitled "Unattended Animals on Highway Prohibited" provides in
pertinent part as follows:
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Every person . . . herding . . . or
allowing to run at large, or causing to be
herded . . . or allowed to run at large,
any . . . cow . . . upon any of the public
highways of the county shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.
To the extent Section 10-10-3, the County
Ordinance or rule or regulation, is "in conflict with the
provisions of this act (41-6-38)," it, Section 10-10-3, is
not enforceable.

Since Section 41-6-38 covers civil actions

involving "Livestock on Highway" (Section 10-10-3 covers
criminal matters involving "animals on highway"), Section
41-6-38, a legislative enactment and statute, preempts Section
10-10-3, a county ordinance, rule or regulation.
Thus, the Court properly refused to give plaintiff's
proffered supplemental instructions on negligence per se,
copies of which are attached as addendum 2, 3, 4 and 5 to
plaintiff's brief.

Such instructions were improper and not in

accordance with Utah law.
POINT V
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE TRIAL COURTS'
REFUSAL TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTION ON STRICT
LIABILITY
Defendants Sutton incorporate by referenced the
arguments made under Point V of defendant LDS Church and
Giblett's brief with the following additional argument.
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There is no evidence in the record that the cow in
question had a "dangerous or vicious tendency11 as alleged by
plaintiff.

The mere fact that the cow somehow escaped from the

LDS Church property to Suttonfs property and then remained
there without incident or problem until John Sutton and Charles
Giblett attempted to load it with one other cow so as to return
the escaped cow to the LDS Church property certainly is
insufficient to put John Sutton on notice that he is dealing
with a cow with a "dangerous or vicious propensity" to injure
or damage others.
Thus, the court properly refused to give plaintifffs
proffered instruction no. 25, a copy of which is attached as
addendum 6 to plaintiff's brief.

Such instruction would have

been improper under the facts and evidence in this case.
CONCLUSION
Defendants Sutton submit that regardless of how the
court rules with respect to the voir dire examination by the
court and/or the alleged impropriety of counsel for the LDS
Church in referring to his client as the "Welfare Farm," such
ruling should not affect the Suttons and the jury verdict in
their favor and against the plaintiff should be affirmed.
Defendant Suttons also submit that the requested jury
instructions on the issues of res ipsa loquitur, negligence per
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se and strict liability were properly refused under the facts
of this case.

Plaintiff was given a fair trial under

instructions permitting the jury to find any or all of the
defendants negligent in their conduct in loading the cattle,
attempting to contain the heifer after it escaped, and in the
manner of giving warning to oncoming traffic.

The jury decided

that defendants were not negligent but that plaintiff was
negligent in his approach to the accident scene.

The judgment

of the trial court based upon the special verdict should be
affirmed.
DATED this

^

day of July, 1986.
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING

Stephen G. Morgan
fl
Attorneys for Defendants
Suttons
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